Using billions of observations on the locations of bank branches and firms in China, we measure lender-borrower distance by geographic information system (GIS) and find a non-trivial amount of distant lending. Distant borrowers are more likely to be connected to banks' local borrowers. We use novel data of monthly internal loan rating changes to directly measure soft information by tracing whether banks downgrade ratings before delinquency. For connected borrowers, banks have better soft information and predict delinquent events more accurately. This effect is more pronounced for distant borrowers. Consequently, connected borrowers' delinquent rate is lower. Our findings show that the inter-firm network facilitates banks to collect soft information and manage risks, especially for distant borrowers.
Introduction
Banks rely heavily on relationship lending and invest substantially in soft information collection from borrowers to manage default risks. A major challenge in the literature is how to measure the degrees of soft information. Due mainly to data limitation, researchers can't observe borrower soft information directly and use various proxies to extrapolate it. 2 For example, borrower proximity could reduce banks' costs of loan screening and monitoring which facilitates the collection of soft information (e.g., Degryse and Ongena (2005) ; Dass and Massa (2010) ). In contrast, researchers have shown that the geographic proximity becomes less relevant in relationship lending (e.g., Petersen and Rajan (2002) ). It is a long-standing puzzle on whether borrower proximity and other commonly used relationship measurements could fully capture soft information. This is a major obstacle to study the economic consequences of relationship lending.
In this paper, we discover a substantial amount of distant lending and find that the distant borrowers are more likely to be connected to banks' local borrowers via an interfirm network. The novel data on internal loan rating changes allow us to directly observe banks' soft information on borrowers, i.e., downgrading the internal loan ratings before the delinquency. We find that banks can predict the delinquent events more accurately for connected borrowers, especially for distant loans. This suggests that soft information could be passed via the firm network to facilitate distant lending. The inter-firm network serves as a novel channel of banks' soft information collection for distant borrowers.
More specifically, we use the big data of seven million loans from the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and calculate the physical distance of billions of lenderborrower pairs by using geographic information system (GIS). The CBRC data record the detailed loan-level information (e.g., loan contract terms, borrower and lender information such as ID and location, and delinquency) for seventeen largest commercial banks and two policy banks in China between 2006 and 2013. The data cover over seven 2 Many studies, such as Bolton et al. (2016) and Hombert and Matray (2016) , argue that there is no consensus in the literature on how to identify soft information and the correlations among different relationship measures are low. Karolyi (2017) find that the average correlation coefficients of some wellused relationship proxies are 0.38. million individual corporate loans which include all borrowers with an annual credit line over US$8 million. The data count for approximately 80% of the total bank loan market in China. We also obtain the population data of all bank branches in China (i.e., over 200 thousand branches of around 2,800 banking financial institutions) between 1949 and 2016. For each branch, the data record the branch name, ID, hierarchy, full addresses, and the exact opening and closing dates. We employ the GIS technology to obtain the geographic coordinates of firms and bank branches and calculate their physical distances.
Our first analysis concerns the borrower proximity and lending intensities. In particular, for each pair of bank-firm, we calculate the share of loan amounts and the share of loan numbers that have been borrowed from the bank, whether the firm borrowed any new loans from the bank in past 12 months, and the number of banks with outstanding loans. These four variables of lending intensities have been used widely in the literature to measure the lender-borrower relationships. 3 We find that the correlations are low among these measurements, especially between distance and others.
This suggests that these proxies are either noisy or capture different aspects of borrowers' soft information. Moreover, we perform the OLS regressions of these lending intensity variables on the distance and its quadratic term. We find a robust U-shaped pattern; the linear term of distance is negatively associated with lending intensities while the quadratic term of distance is positively associated with lending intensities. Based on the estimated coefficients, banks decrease their lending intensities with distance within a certain range (around 250 km) but start to increase the lending intensities with distance when the firm is beyond this range. There is a substantial amount of distant lending, e.g., 11% of the loans go to distant borrowers.
Next, we explore the underlying channels behind the significant amount of distant lending. We find that the distant loans are mainly from the bank branches located outside of borrowers' cities (i.e., outside city loans). For example, the average lender-borrower distance is 277 km for outside city loans while it is 42 km for inside city loans. 4 Furthermore, we construct the inter-firm network from the CBRC loan-level data that record each borrower's connected firms such as sibling firms, related transaction parties, or shareholders. We then define a borrower as connected to the lending bank if any of its connected firms are local borrowers of the same bank (i.e., borrowing inside city loans).
We find that a 100% increase in distance is associated with a 2.4% increase in the borrower's likelihood of being connected to the bank via the firm network. This suggests that the inter-firm network could facilitate distant lending.
To further test whether soft information could be passed through via the firm network, we use the novel data of internal loan rating changes to directly measure soft information.
Specifically, for each loan, the CBRC records the internal ratings at the monthly frequency. 5 This allows us to observe whether the banks foresee the delinquency and downgrade ratings before the actual late payments (we call it "early prediction" in the paper). Condition on delinquency, we first perform the OLS regressions of whether the banks downgrade the internal ratings before the actual late payments on whether the delinquent borrower is connected or not. We find that, for distant borrowers, one more connection to the borrower is associated with a 13.6% increase in the banks' ability to early prediction of delinquent events. Moreover, we also study how many months in advance that the banks can predict delinquent events. On average, banks can predict the delinquent event 33.6% earlier for one unit increase in borrowers' number of connections in long distance. For borrowers close-by, we don't find significant effects of the firm network on the early prediction. One caveat is that besides soft information, banks could make the downgrade decisions based on public information of the borrowers. We control for the firm×year fixed effects to eliminate all the firm-specific time trends (e.g., firmspecific public information). The variation we exploit is within the same firm-year and cross banks which captures soft information of particular lenders.
To establish the causal effects of borrower proximity on different channels of soft information collection, we use the 2009 bank entry deregulation in China as the 5 China introduces the international five-category loan classification for risk management, in which there are five levels for standard rating based on internal rating technology. 1 is the highest rating for the "normal" loans, 2 is for the "special mentioned", 3 is for the "substandard", 4 is for the "doubtful" and 5 is for the "loss". In this paper, rating is a dummy variable for whether the rating is 1 or others (i.e., ratings from 2 to 5). A loan is classified as a "non-performing loan" if it is classified as "sub-standard", "doubtful" or "loss". In the first stage regressions, the bank-firm distances decrease significantly after the shock in the deregulated cities. On average, due mainly to the increased number of new branches, the bank-firm distances decrease significantly by 1.4% in deregulated cities after April 2009. In the second stage, consistent with OLS results, the coefficients of LogDistance are significantly negative while the interactions of LogDistance and interfirm network connection variables have significantly positive coefficients for the early prediction dummy. On average, for connected borrowers, a 100% increase in distance leads to a 9.45 % increase in the likelihood of the rating downgrades before delinquency.
Moreover, the number of months of early prediction also increases for connected distant borrowers. Specifically, a 100% increase in distance leads to 13.2%, 18.8%, and 15.5% increases in early prediction length for borrowers connected via their sibling firms, firms with related transactions, and shareholders respectively.
In sum, our findings show that distant borrowers are more likely to be connected to the local borrowers of the bank. On the one hand, consistent with conventional wisdom, borrower proximity could reduce the monitoring and screening costs of obtaining soft information. The firm network doesn't seem to play a role in passing soft information when borrowers are close-by since the bank can cheaply obtain borrowers' soft information by screening and monitoring. On the other hand, the firm network could overcome the increased costs of soft information collection which helps banks discover good quality borrowers in long distance. Banks use different methods to collect soft information in the long vs. short distance. Specifically, the firm network is an essential 6 Gao et al. (2018) use the same shock to establish the causal effects of increased bank competition. In China, there are three types of banks; the big five state own commercial banks, twelve joint equity commercial banks, and municipal commercial banks. See detailed discussion in Section 4. channel of soft information collection for distant lending which improves the predictions of loan delinquency and facilitates the risk management.
In a next step, we explore firm networks' heterogenous effects on soft information collection across various borrowers. Relationship lending is mainly for the small and medium enterprises (SME) while the large firms borrow transaction loans primarily. We refer to the official classification of SME in China to stratify our sample into SMEs and large firms. 7 We find that for SMEs, the firm network could significantly improve the early prediction of delinquent events of distant lending. In contrast, this effect is muted for large firms as predicted by the literature on relationship lending. Moreover, 21% of the loans in our sample have third-party guarantees. The guarantors are legally obliged to make loan payments in default events. We find that the firm network facilitates soft information collection only for loans without guarantees which suggests that banks have lower incentives to collect soft information when the loan payments are guaranteed. The findings of SMEs and loan guarantees further strengthen the firm network channel of soft information collection which is novel in the literature.
Lastly, we explore the economic consequences of the firm network on distant lending regarding default risks. We regress the loan defaults (i.e., 90-days delinquency) on whether the borrowers are connected or not. We find that the one more connection for borrowers in the firm network is associated with a 10% decrease in default rate.
Specifically, when the borrowers' sibling firms and related transaction partners also borrower from the same bank, the default rates are 20% and 10% lower. This suggests that the banks can indeed use the soft information collected from the firm network to choose the good quality borrowers for the risk management. This paper contributes to the literature in two folds. First, despite the large body of empirical literature on distance and relationship lending, it is still inconclusive on the consequences of borrowers' geographical proximity. On the one hand, the conventional wisdom argues that borrower proximity lowers screening and monitoring costs which facilitates the collection of soft information and leads to lower borrowing costs and risks (2016); Hombert and Matray (2016) ). 8 On the other hand, distant lending is prevalent in many countries since the geographic proximity becomes less relevant in recent years due to various reasons such as technology advancements, developments of transportation system, and religions (e.g., Petersen and Rajan (2002) ; Giroud (2013); Beck, Ongena, and Şendeniz-Yüncü (2018); Da et al. (2018) ). Moreover, the studies on borrower proximity and relationship lending explore only the monotonic patterns between distance and lending activities. This paper, for the first time, show the non-monotonic pattern of distance and lending activities and the different underlying mechanisms of extracting soft information in short vs. long distance. Especially, the firm network serves as a novel channel to overcome the physical distance and facilitate the information flow from borrowers to lenders in distant lending. This also sheds light on the non-trivial distant lending in many countries worldwide and on the mixed evidence on how geographic distance affect the relationship lending. 9 Our second contribution is to measure soft information directly by using novel data on internal loan rating changes. The key of relationship lending leans on banks' costly monitoring and screening in exchange for soft information, especially for default risks (e.g., Allen (1990); Diamond (1984) ; Winton (1995) ; Boot and Thakor (2000) ). Due mainly to data limitation, researchers can't directly observe lenders' soft information.
Most previous studies extrapolate the degrees of soft information from indirect measurements (e.g., distance, lending frequency, and lending share) which do not correlate strongly with each other. This suggests that these measurements are either noisy or captures different parts of soft information (Bolton et al. (2016) ; Hombert and Matray 8 Besides the studies on proximity and bank lending, people also find the important role of proximity in various economic activities (e.g.,; Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001); Butler (2008); Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) ;). 9 The literature has documented non-trivial amount of distant lending. See Table A2 in Appendix for the details. It is also a long debate in the literature on how lender-borrower relationship affect the lending consequences. On the one side, firms can have better access to finance when they have relationships with banks, which mitigate the issues of asymmetric information (e.g., Peterson and Rajan (1995) ; Berger and Udell (1995); Bharath et al. (2011); Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez, and Udell (2009); Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2010) ). On the other side, firms could be hold up by the relationship lenders and suffer from the price discrimination (e.g., Santos and Winton (2008) ; Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) ).
(2016)). We can observe directly whether banks have soft information to better predict the delinquency by tracing out the dynamics of delinquency and rating changes at the loan level. 10 This is a big step forward in the literature. Giannetti, Liberti, and Sturgess (2017) find that rating changes can be strategic since they would be shared in public. Our internal rating data from the CBRC are not shared among banks which could mitigate the concern of rating manipulation. Moreover, the firm×year fixed effects absorb the public information of individual borrowers which helps tease out the variation of soft information.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the institutional background of the banking system in China. In Section 3 we present our data and summary statistics. Section 4 provides the empirical strategies and results. Section 5 concludes.
Background

Banking System in China
There are mainly three types of banks in China: big five national commercial banks, twelve joint equity banks, and municipal commercial banks. The first tier is the big five commercial banks that are state-owned national banks. In 1983, as part of Den Xiaoping's economic reform, big four commercial banks were established to take charges of commercial businesses in China. In particular, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) focused on the corporate lending business, the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC) focused on the economic development in the rural areas, the Bank of China (BOC) was specialized in the foreign exchange business, and the China Construction Bank (CCB) was responsible for construction and infrastructure developments.
Besides these big four wholly state-owned banks, joint equity banks started to be 
Bank Branches Development
Compared to the big five banks, the developments of the twelve joint equity banks have been suppressed due to the historical reasons and regulations. On the one hand, the big five banks were established earlier and have higher political rankings than joint equity On the other hand, the joint equity banks' branch openings have been strictly regulated. For example, in 2006, the CBRC announced that all the local commercial banks including twelve joint equity banks could only apply to open one branch in each city. 13 Specifically, joint equity banks were not allowed to apply multiple branches in one application. Besides this restriction on numbers, joint equity banks need to apply to CBRC's local office first for the initial approval. After that, they need the approval from 
Data and Summary Statistics
Our paper includes two proprietary datasets for our empirical analyses: CBRC bank branch data and CBRC corporate loan data.
CBRC Branch Data and Loan Level Data
Our primary dataset is from the CBRC that covers all bank branches in China. In the data also contain detailed loan-level information, i.e., the unique firm identifier, firmlevel fundamentals (e.g., size, leverage and location), banks' information (e.g., the names and location of branches), and loan-level characteristics (e.g., loan amount, loan maturity, credit guarantee providers, internal ratings, issuing date, maturity date on contracts, and loan delinquency status). 15 Specifically, for each loan application, the borrower needs to disclose its most related firms (e.g., shareholders, sibling firms with the common shareholder, and firms with other relationships such as related party transactions). Thus, we build the inter-firm network based on these data. The CBRC also records the unique ID of these connected firms of the borrowers so that we can trace the borrowing activities of these connected firms as well. The loan information is mandatorily updated at month frequency during its whole life cycle. In this way, we can trace the dynamics of internal loan ratings and examine whether the banks early downgrade their borrowers before the actual late payments.
GIS and Lender-Borrower Distance
Based on these two datasets, for each loan, we can identify the city where the loan was issued and have the address information of all the branches of the bank in this city. This, thus, allows us to locate the lending bank branches accurately. For borrowers, the CBRC loan-level data record the 9-digit firm ID (i.e., the unique identifier for corporations by the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of China) and the exact addresses of the firm. For the firms without address information, we obtain it from the National Company Credit Information System launched by China's State Administration of Industry and Commerce by using the firm ID. 16 We also manually check the location data which cover approximately 99% of the firms in the cleaned version.
Next, we use the GIS technology to locate the exact longitude and latitude of each borrower and bank branch on the map. In particular, we input the address information to the application programming interface (API) of Autonavi (Amap), the leading company of mapping service provider in China. The outputs from the API are the geographic coordinates of individual firms and bank branches (i.e., four-digit latitudes and longitudes). We restrict the sample to 17 commercial banks (i.e., big five banks and twelve joint equity banks) and their borrowers. 15 However, the data do not record loan interest rates. In China, the lending rate was fully liberalized after July 20, 2013. During our sample period, the bank lending rates were still highly regulated. 16 More information can be accessed via http://www.gsxt.gov.cn/index.html.
We then combine the data of firm locations and bank branch locations to calculate the physical distance between the lenders and borrowers. In particular, we follow the formula proposed by Coval and Moskowitz (1999) For each loan, we calculate the distance between the borrower and all branches in the city where the loan is issued. We then follow the prior literature to choose the shortest one (i.e., the distance between the borrower and the closest bank branch in a given city)
as the lender-borrower distance. Moreover, we also trace the dynamics of branch opening over time and update the lender-borrower distance at the monthly frequency. In total, there are over five billion observations of lender-borrower distance at the loan-branchmonth level. Table A1 in Appendix shows the detailed definition of these variables. The 17 Schenone (2010) introduce an intensity-based relationship variable: the number of historical loans by a bank divided by the total number of loans to date. Bharath et al. (2011) construct two variables: (1) the ratio of total amounts of loans by bank j to borrower i in the last 5 years over the total amounts borrowed by the borrower i in the last 5 years; (2) the ratio of total number of loans by bank j to borrower i in the last 5 years over the total number of loans borrowed by the borrower i in the last 5 year. Regarding our sample period, average distance between firms and their closet bank branches is 59.7 km while the median is about 2.4 km. This is consistent with the statistics in other countries. 18 For Bank_Num, on average, the borrowers have 3.2 lending banks (e.g., Bae, Kang and Lim (2002); Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina (2006)). For LoanAmount_Share and
Summary Statistics
LoanFreq_Share, firms borrow around 45% of their loans (either in loan amount or loan number) from a particular bank (e.g., Schenone (2010) ; Bharath et al. (2011)). For
Recent_Lending, among over 7.5 million firm-bank-month observations, there are 80.8%
of them having borrowing experience from CBRC sample banks in the past 12 months (e.g., Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) ). 19 This number turns to be 77.6% for new loan issuance sample, which suggests that 77.6% new loans in our sample flow into "existing"
borrowers that have got loans from CBRC banks in the past 12 months.
[Place Table 1 about here]
Panel B presents the summary of loan contract terms and borrower characteristics.
The average amount of loan is around 15 million RMB with short-term maturity.
Approximately 21% of loans have third-party guarantee, which provides a credit enhancement scheme for lenders since the guarantors are legally liable to pay back the loans under default event. The default rate defined as over 90 days delinquency is 1.1%
that is comparable to the non-performing loan rate disclosed in banks' annual reports in
China. The average size of firms equals 4.0 billion RMB while the standard deviations are large. On average, the firm leverage level is 61.3%. Moreover, we also construct the borrower connection variables regarding various firm inter-links. In particular, Sibling Firms Connected, Other Related Firms Connected, and Stock Holder Connected are the dummies defined at individual loan level for whether the borrower has any sibling firms (i.e., firms with the same controlling parent company), firms with related party we trace back one year to define our intensity-based relationship variables. Our results are robust to different windows. 18 For example, Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) document that the mean and median values of bankborrower distance in their sample are 9.9 and 2.6 miles, respectively. In Petersen and Rajan (2002) , although the distance between a firm and its lender varies across lender type and the year the relationship began, the median value ranges from 2.0 to 5.0 miles. Using the Turkey data, the distance number calculated in Beck, Ongena, and Şendeniz-Yüncü (2018) is smaller than ours. The median value of distance between the borrower and the closest branch ranges from 0.2 km to 1.5 km.
19 This data set is based on outstanding loans, which is different from the new loan sample when we examine the distance effect on loan contract terms and default risk.
transactions, and shareholders that are located in the same city as the bank and also has been borrowing from this bank. Connection# is the total number of these three types of connections. On average, 16.6%, 18%, and 39.8% of the borrowers are connected to their borrowing banks via sibling firms, firms with related transactions, and shareholders that have also been borrowing from the same banks, respectively.
Panel C summaries the early downgrade activities condition on delinquent loans. As shown in this Panel, around 60% of delinquent loans have no rating changes at all while 41.8% of the default loans were downgraded before the delinquent date. Moreover, on average, banks downgrade these delinquent loans 3.3 months before the actual delinquent time.
Empirical Analysis and Results
Non-monotonic Lending over Lender-Borrower Distance
We start our analysis by comparing various commonly used measures of lenderborrower relationships in the literature. In particular, for each loan, we examine the distance between the bank branch and firm vs. the variables for lending intensities. The conventional wisdom is that banks have better soft information when they have been lending more intensively to the firms (e.g., more frequent, more shares, and fewer lenders). We construct four additional relationship measurements following previous studies in the literature. For each pair of bank-firm-month, we calculate the number of banks with loans outstanding (Bank_Num), two variables of relationship strength measures, i.e., one is the share of loan amounts that have been borrowed from the bank (LoanAmount_Share), and the other is the share of loan numbers that have been borrowed from the bank (LoanFreq_Share), and the dummy for whether the firm borrowed any new loans from the bank in the past 12 months (Recent_Lending).
Based on these variables, we first calculate the correlation matrix in Panel A of Table   2 . We find that the correlations between LogDistance and other four lending intensity variables are near zero. [Place Table 2 about here]
Next, we explore the non-monotonic relationships between the distance and lending intensity. We perform the OLS regressions of the four lending intensity variables on the quadratic forms of distance (i.e., and
2
) . The regression equation is:
where , , is the lending intensity measures (i.e., Recent_Lending and Bank_Num, LoanAmount_Share, and LoanFreq_Share) for firm from bank at month , , , is the natural logarithm of the shortest distance between firm and bank 's branches at month when the loan is issued, and 2 , , is the quadratic term of , , (i.e., , , × , , ). We control for the firm×year fixed effects and bank fixed effects to absorb any variation attributable to constant characteristics within firm years and banks, respectively. The firm-year fixed effects absorb all demand factors of firm borrowing which allows us to examine the variation between distance and lending intensity within the firm-year across banks. The robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Table 3 shows the regression results. In columns (2) to (4), for LoanAmount_Share, LoanFreq_Share, and Recent_Lending, the linear terms of LogDistance have significantly negative coefficients while the quadratic terms of LogDistance have significantly positive coefficients. Moreover, in column (1), distance also shows the Ushaped relationships on Bank_Num (i.e., the firms borrow from more other banks when distance increases but significantly fewer other banks when the distance is very long).
These non-monotonic relationships suggest that the lending intensities are significantly higher for firms which are either closer to the bank branches or more distant from the bank branches than the firms in the middle. We perform the back-to-the-envelope calculation to predict the patterns between distance and lending intensity based on the estimated coefficients in Table 3 . Figure 1 shows very strong predicted U-shaped patterns.
For example, consistent with the results in Table 3 , the LoanFreq_Share decrease with distance between bank branches and firms within 250 km and starts to increase with distance when it is beyond 250 km.
[Place Table 3 and Figure 1 about here]
Furthermore, we find that the distant loans are mainly from the bank branches located outside of borrowers' cities (i.e., outside city loans). For example, the average lender-borrower distance is 277 km for outside city loans while it is 42 km for inside city loans (i.e., borrowers and banks are in the same city). 20 This is consistent with Figure 1 with the parabola vertex at 250 km. Thus, we use 250 km as the cut-off to define the shortvs. long-distance loans. In un-reported robustness checks, our main results remain when we try different cut-offs (e.g., 100 km, 200 km, 300 km, and 400 km). Overall, 11% of the loans go to the distant borrowers. The amount of distant lending in China is substantial and consistent with other countries which have significant amounts of distant lending as well (see Table A2 in Appendix for the summary). The rationale of these intensive lending to long-distance borrowers is beyond the traditional wisdom that the borrower proximity could lower down banks' costs of loan monitoring and screening to extract soft information of the borrowers.
Distant Lending and Inter-firm Network Connection
Next, we explore the underlying channels behind the significant amount of distant lending. In particular, we study the role of the inter-firm network in banks' soft information collection. To formally test it, we regress various connection measures (i.e.,
Sibling Firms Connected, Other Related Firms Connected, Stock Holder Connected, and
Connection#) on the logarithm distance between bank branches and borrowers. We control for loan-level characteristics such as internal rating, guarantee status, loan size, and loan maturity, as well as firm-level characteristics such as firm size and leverage. We also control for the firm×year fixed effects and bank fixed effect. Table 4 shows the regression results. We find that the coefficients of LogDistance are significantly positive for the borrowers' connection. For example, in column (1), the coefficient of LogDistance is 0.034 at 1% significant level. This means that a 100% increase in LogDistance is associated with a 3.2% (i.e., log(2)×0.034/0.744) increase in borrowers' number of connections. More specifically, column (2) and (3) show that the distant borrowers are significantly more likely to have sibling firms and firms with related transactions that are borrowing from the same banks in the same city.
[Place Table 4 about here]
The results in Table 4 provides an underlying mechanism for the U-shaped patterns and distant lending documented in Table 3 . On the one hand, under the conventional wisdom, banks issue more relationship loans to firms close-by due to the low monitoring and screening costs of soft information. This force dominates when borrowers are relatively close to the lenders. Consequently, the shorter the distance is associated with the higher the lending intensities since banks can cheaply identify the good quality borrowers close-by. On the other hand, when the lender-borrower distance passes a certain point, the costs of loan monitoring and screening are mostly fixed and don't vary too much by distance. To find good borrowers, banks need more soft information passed via the firm network that became the primary method of soft information collection. In other words, among distant borrowers, banks prefer the ones that are connected to banks local borrowers for the soft information collection. Our findings in Table 4 suggest that the firm network could overcome the increased costs of soft information collection and, thus, facilitate the distant lending.
Inter-firm Network Connection and Soft Information
Furthermore, we exploit the novel internal rating change data to measure the soft information available to banks directly. In particular, our data record the monthly internal ratings of individual loans. This allows us to trace whether banks downgrade the internal ratings before the actual delinquent events. We assume that better soft information could help banks predict and manage the default risks. Specifically, condition on delinquent loans, we define the variable "Early Downgrade" as the dummy for whether the bank downgrades the internal ratings before the month of the delinquency.
Compared with the other soft information measurements (e.g., distance and lending intensity), the early downgrading is a more direct measure of banks' soft information on borrowers. This is a huge step forward in the relationship banking literature.
To understand the role of the firm network in soft information collection, we stratify our sample into short-vs. long-distance loans. We then perform the OLS regressions of dummy Early Downgrade on whether delinquent borrowers' connections in the firm network. Table 5 shows the regression results where column (1) to (4) are for distant borrowers (i.e., beyond 250km) and column (5) to (8) are for borrowers close by (i.e., within 250km). In column (1) of Panel A, the coefficient of Connection# is 0.136 at 5% significant level. This means that, for distant borrowers, one more connection to the borrower is associated with a 13.6% increase in the banks' ability to early prediction of delinquent events. More specifically, in column (2) to (4), all three types of connections There are two potential concerns about using the early downgrade to measure soft information. First, rating changes can be strategic since they would be shared in public and other banks can free ride on it (e.g., Giannetti, Liberti, and Sturgess (2017) ). Second, banks can use both public and private information in their downgrade decisions. We use the internal loan rating changes in the analysis to mitigate the concern about free-rider since they are not shared among banks. Moreover, we control for the firm×year fixed effects to absorb any variation at firm-year level including firms' public information. The variation we exploit is within the same firm-year but across lenders banks which captures only the soft information of specific lenders. Our findings suggest that firm network is an important channel of soft information collection, especially for distant lending.
[Place Table 5 about here]
Interaction of Distance and Firm Network in Soft Information
Besides the estimations on two subsamples in Table 5 , we further analyze the interaction between distance and firm network connections for soft information collection. In particular, we perform the regressions of the early downgrade on the interaction terms of distance and various borrower connections. The Panel A of Table 6 shows the OLS regression results. On the one hand, in column (1) to (4), all the coefficients of Log(Distance) are significantly negative which means that the longer lender-borrower distance makes it harder for banks to foresee the delinquent events. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that borrower proximity facilitates soft information collection by lowering the costs of loan monitoring and screening. On the other hand, the coefficients of interaction terms between Log(Distance) and borrower connection are significantly positive in column (1) to (4). For example, in column (1), the coefficient of Log(Distance)×Connection# is 0.057 at 5% significant level. This means that, for distant lending, the firm network connection could overcome the increased costs of loan monitoring and screening for borrowers' soft information.
[Place Table 6 about here]
Identification of Distance's Effect on Soft Information Collection
In Panel A of Table 6 To formally employ this shock, we use the 2009 bank entry deregulation in China as the instrument for physical distance between banks and firms. We first perform the regression as follows: In sum, these results show the different underlying mechanisms to collect soft information in short-vs. long-distance borrowers. On the one hand, consistent with the conventional wisdom, when borrowers are geographically close to the bank, the firm network doesn't seem to play a role in passing soft information since the bank can cheaply obtain borrowers' soft information by screening and monitoring. On the other hand, for distant lending, banks mainly collect soft information via the firm network which overcomes the increased costs of loan screening and monitoring and helps bank choose good quality distant borrowers. The soft information improves the predictions of loan delinquency and facilitates the risk management.
SME vs. Large Firms
In a next step, we explore firm networks' heterogenous effects on soft information collection across various borrowers. In particular, the relationship lending is mainly for the SMEs while the large firms borrow more transaction loans since the information asymmetry is more pronounced for SMEs than large firms. We expect the firm networks plays a bigger role for SMEs in soft information collection. We use the official classification of SME in China to stratify our sample into SMEs and large firms.
Specifically, the State Council issued a document, "Standards for Classification of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises", to classify the SMEs and we use firms' total sales in 2008
to separate SMEs and large firms. We then repeat the analysis in Table 6 in two subsamples, respectively. Table 7 shows the regression results. In Panel A, column (1) to (4) are for SMEs, and the coefficient of interaction terms between LogDistance and borrower connections are positive. For example, in column (1), the coefficient of LogDistance×Connection# is 0.051 at 5% significant level while the coefficient of LogDistance is significantly negative.
In contrast, column (5) to (8) Table A5 in Appendix and find similar patterns as in Table 7 . These findings support the hypothesis that the relationship lending is mainly for the SMEs.
[Place Table 7 about here]
Moreover, 21% of the loans in our sample have third-party guarantees. The guarantors are legally liable to make loan payments under default events which lower down banks' incentives to collect soft information for the risk management. In Table A6 , we stratify the sample into loans with and without third-party guarantees and repeat the analysis in Table 6 . We find that the firm network facilitates soft information collection only for loans without guarantees which suggests that banks have lower incentives to collect soft information when the loan payments are guaranteed. The findings of SMEs and loan guarantees further strengthen the firm network channel of soft information collection which is novel in the literature.
Inter-firm Network Connection and Loan Performance
Lastly, we study the economic consequences of the firm network on distant lending regarding the default risks. Specifically, we run OLS regressions of defaults on the interfirm network connections. Table 8 shows the regression results. In particular, the coefficients of borrower connections have significantly negative coefficients. For example, in column (1), the coefficient of Connection# is -0.001 at 1% significant level. This means that one more connection for borrowers in the firm network is associated with a 0.1% decrease in default rate. The average default rate in China is 1.1% so that this reduction equals approximately a 10% decrease in default rate which is both statistically and economically significant. These results suggest that the banks can indeed use the soft information collected from the firm network to choose the good quality borrowers.
Subsequently, the banks can better manage risks and improve the loan performance. This echoes Norden and Weber (2010) who find that public credit ratings and account information is related to the default of short-distance borrowers but not for long distance borrowers. Banks need the soft information to facilitate their distant lending.
[Place Table 8 about here]
Conclusion
In this paper, we document a novel channel of soft information collection. In particular, we find that soft information could be passed through the inter-firm network to facilitate lending, especially for distant borrowers. On the other hand, borrower proximity lowers down the costs of monitoring and screening to collect soft information which helps the banks to choose the better quality borrowers close-by. We use big data in China's banking sector to disentangle these two different underlying mechanisms of extracting soft information in short-vs. long-distance lending. This sheds light on the non-trivial distant lending in many countries worldwide.
Furthermore, by tracing out the monthly internal loan rating changes, we can observe whether the banks can predict the delinquency in advance by lowering down the internal ratings before the actual late payments. This is a big step forward in the literature since the previous studies use indirect proxies to extrapolate the degrees of lender-borrower relationships. The novel dataset of rating changes allows us to observe banks' monitoring dynamics better and to explore the different underlying forces behind these conventional proxies such as distance. This sheds light on the long-standing puzzle of low correlations among conventional proxies of soft information.
China is the second largest economy worldwide, and it has developed the largest banking market across the globe. It is essential to understand how banks collect soft information and issue relationship loans which is vital for the SMEs. This, in turn, would equip us with better tools to study the economic consequences of the relationship lending not only in China but also in other countries.
Figure 1. Distance and Lending Relationship.
The figure plots the U-shape patterns between geographical lender-borrower distance and lending intensities. The horizontal axis represents the logarithm of one plus the distance between bank branches and borrowers. In Panel A, the vertical axis represents the predicted number of banks with loans outstanding based on the regression coefficients estimated in Table 3 . In Panel B, the vertical axis represents the predicted share of loans that have been borrowed from the bank based on the regression coefficients estimated in Table 3 . Table 2 reports the correlation matrix of relationship lending measurements and loan characteristics. Panel A reports the correlation matrix of the five commonly used variables for borrower-lender relationships (i.e., measures of soft information) at the firm-bankmonth level. Panel B reports the correlation matrix of the loan contract terms and the relationship measurements at the loan level. Definitions for these variables are described in Appendix Table A1 . Table 3 reports the OLS regressions of various lending relationship proxies on the quadratic terms of distance between bank branches and borrowers. The sample consists of 7,623,883 firm-bank-month observations from Oct 2006 to Jun 2013. The dependent variables are Bank_Num, LoanFreq_Share, LoanAmount_Share, and Recent_Lending, respectively. The main independent variables are the linear and quadratic terms of LogDistance that is the natural logarithm of one plus the physical distance between banks and borrowers. We control for firm×year fixed effects and bank fixed effects in all regressions. The constants are omitted for brevity. The t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) Table 4 reports the OLS regressions of various borrower connection measurements on the logarithm of borrower-lender distance. Sibling Firms Connected, Other Related Firms Connected, and Stock Holder Connected are the dummies defined at individual loan level for whether the borrower has any sibling firms (i.e., firms with the same controlling parent company), firms with related party transactions, and shareholders that are located in the same city as the bank and also has been borrowing from this bank. Connection # is the total number of these three types of connections. The main independent variable is LogDistance, the natural logarithm of one plus the borrower-lender distance. We control for loan-level characteristics such as internal rating, guarantee status, loan size, and loan maturity, and firm-level characteristics such as firm size and leverage in all columns. The coefficients of constants and control variables are omitted for brevity. We control for firm×year fixed effects and bank fixed effects in all regressions. The t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) Table 5 reports the OLS regression of bank's early downgrade warning on the borrower connections in firm network. The sample consists of 19,051 delinquent loans from Jan 2007 to Jun 2013. Panel A reports the results of OLS regressions of Early Downgrade, a dummy variable indicating whether this delinquent loan's internal rating is downgraded before the delinquency. Panel B reports the results of OLS regressions of Log(Months Earlier) that is the logarithm of one plus the months between date of the first downgrade and the delinquent date. In each panel, columns (1) to (4) report the subsample of long-distance loans (i.e., the distance is longer than 250 km). Columns (5) to (8) report the subsample of short-distance loans (i.e., the distance is shorter than 250 km). Sibling Firms Connected, Other Related Firms Connected, and Stock Holder Connected are the dummies defined at individual loan level for whether the borrower has any sibling firms (i.e., firms with the same controlling parent company), firms with related party transactions, and shareholders that are located in the same city as the bank and also has been borrowing from this bank. Connection# is the total number of these three types of connections. The coefficients of constants and control variables are omitted for brevity. We control for firm×year fixed effects and bank fixed effects in all regressions. The t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 6 reports the interaction effects of distance and firm network connections on early downgrades. Panel A reports the results of OLS regressions and Panel B reports the results of 2SLS regressions. We follow the standard approach in Wooldridge (2002) by using the predicted ( ) (i.e., ( ) � ) from regression of ( ) on the 2009 bank entry deregulation shock (i.e., equation (2)) and its interaction term with connection variables (e.g., ( ) � × #) as the instruments for both ( ) and ( ) × #. The sample consists of 19,051 delinquent loans from Jan 2007 to Jun 2013. There are two dependent variables that characterize the early downgrade activities, i.e., Early Downgrade, a dummy for whether this delinquent loan's internal rating is downgraded before the delinquency and Log(Months Earlier), the logarithm of one plus the months between date of the first downgrade and the delinquent date. We include all main effects of ( ) and connection variables. The coefficients of constants and control variables are omitted for brevity. We control for firm×year fixed effects and bank fixed effects in all regressions. The t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 7 reports the interaction effects of distance and firm network connections on early downgrades for SMEs and large firms. Panel A reports the results of OLS regressions and Panel B reports the results of 2SLS regressions. We follow the standard approach in Wooldridge (2002) by using the predicted ( ) (i.e., ( ) � ) from regression of ( ) on the 2009 bank entry deregulation shock (i.e., equation (2)) and its interaction term with connection variables (e.g., ( ) � × #) as the instruments for both ( ) and ( ) × #. The sample consists of 19,051 delinquent loans from Jan 2007 to Jun 2013. Columns (1) to (4) report the subsample of SME borrowers. Columns (5) to (8) report the subsample of large borrowers. The dependent variables that characterize the early downgrade activities, i.e., Early Downgrade, a dummy for whether this delinquent loan's internal rating is downgraded before the delinquency. We include all main effects of ( ) and connection variables. The coefficients of constants and control variables are omitted for brevity. We control for Firm×Year fixed effects and Bank fixed effects in all regressions. The t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 2013. Sibling Firms Connected, Other Related Firms Connected, and Stock Holder Connected are the dummies defined at individual loan level for whether the borrower has any sibling firms (i.e., firms with the same controlling parent company), firms with related party transactions, and shareholders that are located in the same city as the bank and also has been borrowing from this bank. Connection# is the total number of these three types of connections. We control for loan-level characteristics such as internal rating, guarantee status, loan size, and loan maturity, and firm-level characteristics such as firm size and leverage in all columns. The coefficients of constants and control variables are omitted for brevity. We control for firm×year fixed effects and bank fixed effects in all regressions. The tstatistics based on standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. For each loan, we calculate the physical distances between the firm and all the branches of the issuing bank (approximately one billion observations) then choose the shortest one (i.e., the distance between the borrower and the closest bank branch). We divide it by 100 and take natural logarithm in regressions. Bank_Num
Panel A: OLS
The number of banks with loans outstanding at borrower-month level. LoanAmount_Share
The share of loan amounts that have been borrowed from the specific bank in last 12 months at borrower-bank-month level. LoanFreq_Share
The share of loan numbers that have been borrowed from the specific bank in last 12 months at borrower-bank-month level. Recent_Lending A dummy indicating whether the borrower gets any new loans from the bank in the last 12 months at borrower-bank-month level.
Loan Amount
The balance of each loan contract. The unit is in a million RMB.
Rating Dummy
The credit score placed by the loan officers in the bank. The larger the number, the worse the credit quality of the obligor. It takes the value of one if the rating is in the first category and zeroes otherwise.
Maturity
The term of each loan contract. The unit is months. Guaranteed A dummy variable that equals one if the bank requires third-party guarantee protections and zero otherwise. Default A loan performance measure that equals one if the loan is not repaid over three months after due date and zero otherwise. Rating Change A dummy variable indicating whether the delinquent loan has any rating changes in the loan lifecycle. Early Downgrade A dummy variable indicating whether the delinquent loan is downgraded before the delinquent date. Connection # The aggregate number of different types of connections, i.e. sibling firms, other related firms and stock holders, ranging from 0 to 3. Sibling Firms Connected A dummy variable indicating whether the borrower has any sibling firms (i.e., firms with the same controlling parent company) that has been borrowing from the same bank in the borrower's city. Other Relation Connected A dummy variable indicating whether the borrower has any other connected firms that has been borrowing from the same bank in the borrower's city, such as related party transactions, subsidiary firms, and so on. Stock Holder Connected A dummy variable indicating whether any of the borrower's stock holders are located in the same city as the lending bank branch and these stock holders have been borrowing from this bank.
Months Earlier
The number of months between the initial rating downgrade date and the delinquent date. We take natural logarithm in regressions. Assets
The total assets of firms. The unit is in a million RMB. We take natural logarithm in regressions. For brevity, we report the assets in unit of billion RMB in Table 1 and Table 6 . Leverage Book leverage, measured as the ratio of total liabilities over total assets. SOE A dummy variable based on borrower's registration type, indicating whether the borrower is state owned. Employees
The amount of employment. TFP A measure of firm-level efficiency, i.e., total factor productivity. ATR Asset turnover ratio is defined as the total operating income divided by total assets. After2009
A dummy variable that equals one if it is after the deregulation shock and zeroes otherwise. Treatment A dummy variable at city-bank level takes the value of one if the joint-equity bank has outstanding branches in this city or its capital city of the province before the bank expansion policy shock and zero otherwise. Table A3 : Out-of-City Loans versus Within-City Loans Table A3 reports the loan summary statistics of loan and borrower characteristics. Panel A is for the comparisons between out-of-city loans and within-city loans. Panel B is for the comparisons between distant loans (i.e., beyond 250km) and short-distance loans (i.e., within 250km). The number of loans, the means, medians, and standard deviations are reported. Distance is the physical distance between borrower and lending branch. Assets is the total amount of assets, in unit of a million RMB. Leverage is the total liabilities divided by total assets. SOE is a dummy indicating whether the borrower is state-owned based on registration type. Employees is the number of employees. ATR is the asset turnover ratio defined as the total operating income divided by total assets. TFP is the total factor productivity. Table A4 : Bank Entry Deregulation Impact on Bank-Borrower Distance Table A4 reports the OLS regressions of bank-borrower distance on the bank entry deregulation in April 2009. The sample consists of 7,623,883 firm-bank-month observations and columns (1) to (5) presents the results based on different subsamples with different event windows. Column (1) presents the results of 6-month window subsample estimations, Column (2) presents the results of 12-month window subsample estimations, Column (3) presents the results of 24-month window subsample estimations, Column (4) presents the results of 48-month window subsample estimation, and Column (5) presents the results using overall sample. The dependent variable is the LogDistance, the natural logarithm of one plus the distance between banks and borrowers. The main independent variable is the interaction, Shock2009=Treatment*After2009, where After2009 equals one for observations after the policy shock in Apr, 2009 and zero before and Treatment equals one for treated bank-cities and zero for controlled bank-cities. According to the policy, an eligible Joint-equity bank k in city j free of regulation on new-branch entry is a bank that have outstanding branches in this city or in the capital city of the province that the city j is located in prior to the bank expansion policy shock. For the biggest five state-owned banks, i.e. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Bank of China (BOC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and Bank of Communications (BOCOM), Treatment always equals zero. All variables used in the regression are defined in Table  A1 . The constants are omitted for brevity. We control for firm×year fixed effects and bank fixed effects in all regressions. The t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table A5 reports the interaction effects of distance and firm network connections on months of early downgrades for SMEs and large firms by 2SLS regressions. We follow the standard approach in Wooldridge (2002) by using the predicted ( ) (i.e., ( ) � ) from regression of ( ) on the 2009 bank entry deregulation shock (i.e., equation (2)) and its interaction term with connection variables (e.g., ( ) � × #) as the instruments for both ( ) and ( ) × #. The sample consists of 19,051 delinquent loans from Jan 2007 to Jun 2013. Columns (1) to (4) report the subsample of SME borrowers (i.e., the total assets is lower than 300 million RMB). Columns (5) to (8) report the subsample of large borrowers (i.e., the total assets is lower than 300 million RMB). The dependent variables that characterize the early downgrade activities, i.e., Log(Months Earlier), the logarithm of one plus the months between date of the first downgrade and the delinquent date. We include all main effects of ( ) and connection variables. The coefficients of constants and control variables are omitted for brevity. We control for firm×year fixed effects and bank fixed effects in all regressions. The t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table A6 reports the results of OLS regression estimates on relations between firm network connection and early downgrades. In Panel A, the dependent variable is Early Downgrade, a dummy for whether this delinquent loan's internal rating is downgraded before the delinquency. In Panel B, the dependent variable is Log(Months Earlier), the logarithm of one plus the months between date of the first downgrade and the delinquent date. Sibling Firms Connected, Other Related Firms Connected, and Stock Holder Connected are the dummies defined at individual loan level for whether the borrower has any sibling firms (i.e., firms with the same controlling parent company), firms with related party transactions, and shareholders that are located in the same city as the bank and also has been borrowing from this bank. Connection# is the total number of these three types of connections. Columns (1) to (4) report the subsample of loans without third party guarantees. Columns (5) to (8) report the subsample of loans with third party guarantees. The coefficients of constants and control variables are omitted for brevity. We control for firm×year fixed effects and bank fixed effects in all regressions. The t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
